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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of

)

LLOYD A. FRY COMPANY,

)

Appellant.

Case No. 13980

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Air Conservation
Committee finding that emissions from the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Company plant, in Woods Cross, Utah, were in violation of Section 3.2,
Code of Air Conservation Regulations.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Utah Air Conservation Committee asks this court to review
the matter and affirm the order of Dr. Grant S. Winn, Decision and
Orders entered by the Utah Air Conservation Committee, and Memorandum
Decision of the Third Judicial District Court.

Respondent further

asks this court to sustain the finding and conclusions of the Utah
Air Conservation Committee, which were based upon substantial evidence.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dr. Grant S. Winn, Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Conservation Committee, sent notices to the manager of the Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Company, located at Woods Cross, Utah, prior to September 4,
1973.

These notices indicated that the emissions from the stacks

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at the plant were in direct violation of Section 3.2.1 of the Code
of Air Conservation Regulations for Visible Emissions. The visible
emission's regulations clearly define the term "contaminant" and
then set the necessary emission limitations so as to insure that
the air we breathe will not become injurious to human health or welfare, animal or plant life# or property, nor would it unreasonably
interfere with the enjoyment of life or use of property.
Section 3.2.1 of the Code of Air Conservation Regulations is
clear, reasonable and provides fair and adequate warning to any violator.

Section 3.2.1 states as follows:

3.2.1. Single sources of emission from existing
installations except incinerators and internal combustion
engines shall be of a shade or density no darker than a
No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or an equivalent opacity.
On the 16th day of January, 1974, Dr. Grant S. Winn issued an
order to the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company that his Woods Cross facility was in violation of Section 3.2 of the Visible Emissions Regulations.

The Lloyd A. Fry Company operates an asphalt spray process

upon felt material in the production of asphalt shingles used in
roofing.

Dr. Winn indicated in his order that the Fry Company was

causing single source

emissions from its west stack and east stack

as a result of the asphalt spray process upon the felt material. The
findings of Dr. Winn indicated that the emissions were not the result
of the operation of incinerators or internal combustion engines.
Certain members of the staff of the Utah Air Conservation Committee and the Davis County Health Department made inspections of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Lloyd A. Fry Company facility at Woods Cross on the following dates
with these results:
DATE

OPACITY
West Stack

9/6/73 (highest, and lowest of 12
readings)

East Stack

45%-60%

9/27/73 (highest and lowest of 7
readings)

35%-55%

10/3/73 (single reading)

55%

10/4/73 (average of readings
over 45-minute period)

45%-50%

10/9/73 (five-minute reading highest and lowest point)

40%-60%

40%-60%

11/9/73 (single reading)

45%

50%

These staff members are trained to read the opacity of emissions
from a stationary source and must qualify as observers for visually
determining the opacity of emissions.

These individuals receive

training and certification and learn procedures to be used in the
field fa: the determination of plume opacity.

40 C.F.R. (Code of

Federal Regulations) 60 sets forth the standard of performance for
stationary sources.

The appendix to these standards describes the

method of making a visual determination of the opacity of emissions
from the stationary sources.

The procedure in making the opacity

observations with regard to the steam plumes states the following:
2.3 Observations. Opacity observations shall be
made at the point of greatest opacity in that portion
of the plume where condensed water vapor is not present.
The observer shall not look continuously at the plume,
but instead
shall observe the plume momentarily at 15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
second intervals. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.3.1 Attached steam plumes. When condensed water
vapor is present within the plume as it emerges from the
emission outlet, opacity observations shall be made beyond the point in the plume at which condensed water vapor
is no longer visible. The observer shall record the
approximate distance from the emission outlet to the point
in the plume at which the observations are made*
2.3.2 Detached steam plumes. When water vapor in
the plume condenses and becomes visible at a distinct
distance from the emission outlet, the opacity of emissions should be evaluated at the emission outlet prior
to the condensation of water vapor and the formation of
the steam plume. 40 C.F.R. 60.
The qualified observers are trained to read the plume at the
point of greatest opacity beyond the breakpoint where the steam
dissipates, or in that portion of the plume where condensed water
vapor is absent.

The readings were taken by these certified smoke

readers beyond the point at which condensed water vapor is no
longer visible.

This procedure was employed because the Fry plumes

were attached plumes rather than detached plumes as set forth above
in the procedure.

These provisions were added by the Environmental

Protection Agency to make it clear that the opacity of contaminated
water in steam plumes is to be read at the point where water does
not exist in condensed form.

The two specific instructions are (1)

where the case for opacity can be observed prior to the formation
of the condensed water plume, and the other (2) for the case where
opacity is to be observed after the condensed water plume has
dissipated.
The opacity of white plumes is measured in terms of percentage,
while the opacity of black plumes is measured in terms of numbers
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
_ 4may
- contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

from a Ringelmann Chart.

Each number from 1 to 5 on the Ringelmann

Chart represents an increase of 20% opacity from zero.
lent opacity of a Ringelmann Chart No. 2 is 40%.

The equiva-

The single sources

of emission from the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company were of a shade or
density darker than No. 2, Ringelmann Chart (40% black), or equivalent opacity, on the dates above mentioned.

Such readings disclose

a violation of Section 3.2.1, Visible Emissions Regulations, Code
of Air Conservation Regulations.

The breakpoint of a wet plume

(one containing visible, uncombined water) is the point where the
uncombined water disappears from the plume.

The readings taken by

the state and county observers were made beyond this breakpoint.

The

particulate matter in a wet plume can be accurately read beyond the
breakpoint and the plume at that point is free of visible, uncombined
water.

The readings taken from the east and west stacks of the Lloyd

A..Fry Company were of particulate matter, and the emissions were
read beyond the breakpoint.

The excessive emission readings from

the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company process were of air contaminants
within the meaning of Section 1.1.3, Code of Air Conservation Regulations and were neither the result of an unavoidable breakdown of
equipment or procedures nor the result of a procedure necessary to
the operation of a process described in Section 3.2.6(b), Visible
Emissions Regulations, Code of Air Conservation Regulations.
Dr. Grant S. Winn issued his order of January 16, 1974, that
the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company submit to his office within 30
days of the receipt of that order a request for variance, accomDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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panied with a compliance schedule or cease operation of the facility.
This order, under authority of Section 26-24-11, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended) was to become final, unless within 20 days of its
receipt a written request for a hearing before the Utah Air Conservation Committee was made by the Lloyd A. Fry Company as provided
in Section 26-24-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
requested

Fry

a hearing before the Air Conservation Committee to answer

charges, which commenced on April 4, 1974, before a Subcommittee of
the Utah Air Conservation Committee,

The hearing was recessed on

April 5, 1974, and reconvened on May 15, 1974, on which date the
hearing was concluded.

The Subcommittee affirmed Dr. Winn's order

dated January 16, 1974.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company then filed a Motion of Review of
the Decision of the Subcommittee, which Decision was reviewed by the
Utah Air Conservation Committee on December 19, 1974.

The Utah Air

Conservation Committee affirmed the Decision of the Subcommittee of
Hearing Examiners in accordance with Section 26—24—11, Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).

Fry appealed the Decision of the

Committee to the Third Judicial District Court in defiance of
Section 26-24-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

The office

of Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal of Fry
in light of the statute which permits judicial review before the Utah
Supreme Court, rather than a district court.

This statute provides:

(1) Except as specifically provided in this section and in
section 26-24-11 (5) (e), all final orders or determinations
of the committee or the executive secretary are subject to
judicial review in the Supreme Court of Utah. . ."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fry's appeal was dismissed by the Third Judicial District Court on
January 31, 1975. Fry then filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah
Supreme Court on February 4, 1975.
STATEMENT OF THE LAW
The Air Conservation Act was enacted by the Utah State Legislature in 1967 (Laws of 1967, Chapter 47, Paragraph 1). This act
created within the Division of Health, the Air Conservation Council,
now known as the Air Conservation Committee, and empowered it to act
in the control, abatement and prevention of air pollution. The
Federal Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 1857 et. seq.) was amended by Public
Law 91-604, dated December 31, 1970, entitled "Clean Air Amendents
of 1970."

Section' 108 of that Act required the administrator to pub-

lish a list of air pollutants, which, in his judgment, have an adverse
effect on public health and welfare and the presence of which in the
ambient air resulted from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources.

It further provided that the administrator, after consul-

tation with appropriate advisory committees and federal departments
and agencies, issue to the states and appropriate air pollution control agencies information on air pollution control techniques, and
such information was to include data relating to the technology and
costs of emission control.

Section 109 of the federal act required

the administrator to promulgate regulations setting forth a national
primary ambient standard for each air pollutant. A primary ambient
air quality standard is one which the attainment and maintenance in the
-7-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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judgment of the administrator, is requisite to protect the public
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
the presence such air pollutant in the ambient air.

Section 107 of

the Federal Act states that each state is to have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area
comprising the state, by submitting an implementation plan .for such
state, which must specify the manner in which national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards
*

are to be met, achieved and

maintained within each air quality control region of the State.
Section 110 of the Act required each state, after public hearing, to
adopt and submit to the administrator a plan providing for the implementation, maintenance and enforcement of each primary standard and
each secondary standard.

The adminstrator was thereafter required

to approve or disapprove the plan so submitted and set out

criteria

of ei^ht requirements that each plan must fulfill before it could be
approved.

One of these criteria necessary was that the plan must

include emission limitations (see Section 110(a)(2)(B) of said Glean
Air Act Amendment)m

Thereafter, the Utah Legislature, in 1971, made

two significant changes in the Air Conservation Act (Laws 1971,
Chapter 54, Paragraphs 1 and 2 ) . Section 26-24-1.5 was added to the
Air Conservation Act.

This provision sets forth a declaration of

public policy and states the purpose of the act.

Section 26-24-1.5(1)

reads as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this
state and the purpose of this act to achieve and maintain
such levels of air quality as will protect human health and
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safety, and to the greatest degree practicable, prevent
injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the
comfort and convenience of the people, promote the economic
and social development of the state, and facilitate the
enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state.
Subparagraph (3) reads in part as follows:
To these ends it is the purpose
provide a framework within which air
protected and consideration given to
terest at all levels of planning and
within the state.

of this act to
quality may be
the public indevelopment

Subparagraph (2) was then added to 26-24-10, which reads as follows:
The committee may establish such emission control
requirements by rule, regulation or standard as in its
judgment may be necessary to prevent, abate, or control
air pollution. These requirements may be for the state
as a whole or may vary from area to area, as may be
appropriate, to facilitate accomplishment of the purposes of this act, and in order to take account of
varying local conditions. In adopting these emission
control requirements, the committee shall conduct public
hearings in the same manner and under such terms and
conditions and with the same notice as required in Subsection (1) of this section.
The Air Conservation Committee thereafter developed a plan for control
of particulate matter.
of emission

Within the plan, and to meet the requirement

control, was the Air Conservation Regulation 3.2.

This

plan was submitted to the administrator and approved by him, and is
now enforceable by both the state and federal authorities.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The provisions of the Utah Air Conservation Act and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto are valid and provide adequate
constitutional safeguards to determine whether or not a violation
_9_
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has occurred.

The standards set forth in the Utah Air Conservation

Act, Section 1.1.3 and Section 3/12 of the Visible Emission Regulations,
Code of Air Conservation Regulations, are clear, reasonable and provide fair and adequate warnings to any violator thereof.

These

regulations provide a clear and accurate definition of "contaminant"
sufficient for a determination to be made by administrative procedure as to whether the "contaminant" does or does not become injurious to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or property,
or would unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or use
of property."

The definition of "contaminant" specifically excludes

steam and water vapor.
Each individual smoke reader testified that their opacity
readings were taken beyond the "breakpoint" where the water vapor
has dissipated and the dry contaminant continues skyward (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 95-97).

A trained smoke reader can clearly determine the

"breakpoint" of a wet plume when the water vapor evaporates (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 18-20, 73, 76-77, 95-97, 100-101, 120, 154, 185, 218-219; Vol. II,
pp. 39, 178). Certified smoke readers receive field experience in
addition to the smoke school to qualify to read wet plumes.
The visual readings of the smoke reader at the smoke school
are compared to precise readings monitored by an electric eye in
order to calibrate his eyeball for making objective visual readings
and to eliminate as much subjectivity as possible
pp. 13-26, 30-34).
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(Tr. Vol. I,

Guidelines are set forth by the regulations of the Environmental
Protection Agency for reading wet plumes.

The trained smoke reader

learns to calibrate his eyeballs and take appropriate readings beyond
the breakpoint.

The members of the staff who made the opacity

readings on visible emissions received adequate field training to read
smoke plumes containing water vapor (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 18, 24-25, 3031, 73-74, 95, 100-101, 156-157, 217-218; Vol. II, pp. 39, 178,
183-189, 197-200).
The appellant failed to show any discrepancy between "white"
and "black" plumes.

It has been shown that the smoke reader must

calibrate his eyeballs to read the spacities of both black and white
smoke in order to obtain certification (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 15-17, 40-42).
Smoke readers are trained at the smoke school and through
field experience to read dry and wet plumes.

They are given certain

guidelines about where to stand and under what conditions they are
to read the plumes.

The ideal conditions prescribed are not always

possible, and therefore, the smoke reader must exercise his judgment
in taking readings under the best conditions available under the
existing circumstances.
Some states have adopted regulations which take into account
the fact that visible emissions readings may be taken under other than
ideal conditions.

For example, the Iowa rules adopted in Chapter 11,

entitled "Qualification in Visual Determination of the Opacity of
Emissions" in Section 11.1(2) under procedures reads, in part, as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

follows:

"For stationary sources, the qualified observer
stands at a distance from the base of the stack necessary
to obtain a clear view of the appropriate portion of
the plume, with the sun to his back but not more than
45° to either side. . . ."

Iowa rules outline the qualifications for the observer in
11.1(1), which states, in part, as follows:

"To qualify as an observer in reading visible emissions,
a candidate must complete a smoke reading course conducted
by the department or an equivalent course. The smoke
• generator used to qualify the observers must be equipped
with a calibrated smoke indicator or light transmission
meter located on the source stack if the smoke generator
is to determine the actual opacity of the emissions."

When a smoke reader takes his readings, the nature of the
material and the type of process being employed by an industry have
nothing to do with the accuracy of his reading.

The trained smoke

reader makes an eyeball calibrated reading of the opacity of the
plume which can be appropriately measured, regardless of the process, of the chemical and material employed.

He is measuring

the amount of dry particulate which is the by-product of the process,
and such amount can be accurately measured in terms of its opacity
in the plume released from the industry's stacks.

The nature of

the process and the materials used have no correlation with visible
emissions readings and evaluations.

In taking his readings, the

smoke reader is not required to establish continuous violations.
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The fact that he can measure a violation upon a single reading is
sufficient to establish his burden of proof that a plant or industry is emitting dry particulate in such a quantity as to cause a
plume opacity beyond the permitted level of the visible emissions
regulations.
The readings taken by the smoke readers of the Fry Plant were
after steam or water vapor dissipations.

From the lip of the stack

to the breakpoint, and even before the particulate reaches the lip
of the stack, there is a dissolution factor which allows for dispersion of some of the particulate prior to the breakpoint.
dissolution factor gave for the Fry Plant

This

an inherent advantage,

in that the readings were taken beyond the breakpoint.

(Tr. Vol. I,

pp. 19, 20 and 2 8 ) .
The readings taken were accurate, in that the training and
experience taught the smoke ,readers to take into account atmospheric
conditions, including wind velocity, ambient temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, cloud cover and position of the sun
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 13-26, 31-33, 74, 80-83, 117-121, 153-160, 217-221).
The smoke readers presented testimony that bears directly on
the issue of wet plume breakpoints, that is, where the steam or water
vapor condenses and falls away, and where the dry contaminant continues
skyward.

Each observer pointed out that there was a definite break-

point and that it was easy to distinguish and read.

For example,

Mr. Bradford testified that they "(learned) to evaluate at the point
there is that break between steam and particulate matter in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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also testified, stating

the determination of where particulate separates from the water
cloud was a fairly simple one.

(Vol. I, p. 95)

The points of

evaluation by the "smoke readers" were made in accordance with their
training and certification at right angles to the plume at proper
distances with the sun to their backs.

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 81-82,

119-120, 149, 153-156, 217-221).
Visual tests are accurate and may be considered as competent
evidence upon which an order can be made (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 18-2 7;
Vol. II, p. 178). There has been a showing of relative consistency
in the readings of smoke readers with minimal subjective error
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 13-26).
The appellant has failed to show that more sophisticated and
accurate instruments provide for a better and more objective evaluation of alleged air contaminants than the visual tests by trained
and qualified smoke readers.

The smoke generator used to train a

smoke reader has an electric eye to obtain exact measurements of
opacity to compare with the visual readings of the smoke reader in
order to calibrate his eyeball (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 21-41).

No equivalent

is available for evaluating or monitoring wet plumes (Tr. Vol. I, p. 4 7 ) .
Adequate records of the opacity readings were made by each
smoke reader in writing with memoranda to Dr. Grant S. Winn for the
business files of the Air Quality Section, Bureau of Environmental
Health.

Each smoke reader contacted the office of the Lloyd A. Fry

Roofing Company prior to the taking of his readings.
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After the

readings were taken by the smoke readers, they contacted the office
of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company to show Mr. Dan Springer and other
officials the readings which were taken

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 60-64,

102-104, 1-5, 110-113, 116, 134, 136-138, 143, 149-152, 163-180,
192-194, 196-198, 201, 214, and p. 216; see Exhibits 4, 5, 9. 10,
11, 12 and 14.
The notes of the smoke readers were made available at the hearing, in addition to the memoranda, and both the notes and the memoranda were properly admitted and made a part of the record.
The Air Quality Section held a meeting with the officials
and legal counsel of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company and inspected
the plant in Woods Cross on September 5, 1973

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 61-

64, 111, 112). Richard L. Harvey, Davis County Health Department,
sent a letter to Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company on October 10, 1973,
with regard to violations of Visible Emissions Regulations (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 151-152).

Dr. Grant S. Winn, Executive Secretary, Utah Air

Conservation Committee, issued his order dated January 16, 1974,
notifying Mr. Donald D c Foster of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company
of the dates and the results of the opacity readings.
The transcript of the hearing shows no evidence presented by
the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company that the wet plumes from their company differ from other wet plumes.

Smoke readers were trained to

read wet plumes in order to qualify to make readings of the plumes
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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from the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, 24-25,

30-31, 73-74, 95, 100, 101, 156-157, 217-218; Vol. II, p. 39, 178,
173-179, 183-189, 197-200).
Dr. Grant S. Winn, Chief of the Air Quality Section, Utah
State

Division

of Health, was the first of many to testify as to

the readibility of "wet" plumes.

Dr. Winn possessed the most im-

pressive qualifications of any witness (Vol. I, p. 8) and has had
extensive experience in teaching, government, and industry.

His

testimony concerning wet plume readings was that:

"an experienced observer would have no difficulty
in determining where the water could dissipate and
the other particulate or other more particulate matter continues and an evaluation is made." (Vol. I, p. 20)
Again, referring to the breakpoint, he said:

"a very definite break *(occurs) when that steam plume
dissipates. Very definite." (Vol. I, p. 30)

It is interesting that two witnesses for the Lloyd A. Fry
Company, Dr. Dale Parker and Mr. Donald Foster, testified concerning
"wet" plume reading, yet neither were qualified smoke readers and
neither had any previous experience in reading for opacity in visible
emissions in plumes similar to those of the Fry process.

Mr. Chaffin,

the only qualified smoke reader presented by the defense, made his
readings at the Fry plant on May 14, 1974, between noon and 1:00 p.m.
At that time of day and year in this latitude, the sun would have
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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been in his eyes, clearly in violation of standard EPA procedure,
and caused an inaccurate reading.
Appellant argues that the breakpoint of a wet plume> where
the uncombined water visibly separates from the particulate matter
is impossible to determine, yet expert witnesses certified as smoke
readers testified under oath that "an experienced observer would have
no difficulty in determining /where or whether/ the water cloud
dissipates and other particulate or other more particulate matter
continues."

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 20, 120, 154, 202, 218). A witness

for the appellant agreed that the breakpoint can be read and one
testified that he had often observed such a line of the Fry plume.
Dr. Dale Parker, in his testimony, stated the following:

" I think that in my observations passing the plant
I have seen the breakpoint occasionally. But, it isnft
there all the time, so »I have to conceive that point that
it is possible for that moisture to break at times."
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 52)

Dr. Parker went on further to testify as to a clear line of demarcation for the break point.

The transcript of the hearing indicates

the following testimony:

QUESTION (Mr. Hanson)

And, you have just mentioned to one
of the committee members that occasionally you can have a clear
demarcation, have you ever seen that?

ANSWER (Dr. Parker)

I have seen it in a lot of different
stacks. You can see it in many or
in a lot of different plumes around
the valley. You can see it very
definitely.
have
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in the Fry plant where I could
consider that to be a good breakpoint. It isn f t close to the stack.
It's generally out a way."

Dr. Dale Parker testified for the Lloyd A. Fry Company, yet
his testimony clearly states that he has not been trained as a smoke \
reader and has not been certified to read wet plumes (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 247-248, 252). Dr. Parker never indicated in his experience at
the Dugway Proving Grounds established no correlation with any
processes similar to that of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company
•(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 248-250)

(He specifically stated that the plumes

with which he worked at Dugway were other than steam plumes).
The Air Conservation Committee had called Mr. Luedtke to
testify.

He gave his expert opinion based on facts and information

supplied to him by the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company.

Mr. Luedtke

has a Bachelorfs Degree in Chemical Engineering from Oregon State
University and a Master's Degree in Chemistry with Mechanical
Engineering as a Minor from Washington State University.

He cur-

rently holds a Certificate in Industrial Relations from UCLA and is
a Registered Professional Mechanical Engineer and a Registered Metalurgical Engineer in the State of California

(Tr. Vol. II, p.167).

Mr. Luedtke testified as to his experience with asphalt saturators,
and that he had either run source tests or read smoke emissions
and processed numerous applications for numerous plants in Los Angeles
area

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 169). He further testified to his experience

with processes identical to the Fry Plant at Woods Cross
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(Tr. Vol. II-,

pp. 170-171).

To determine the amount of dry particulate and the

amount of water vapor which exits the stack of the Fry Company, Mr.
Luedtke was supplied with the necessary plant information and data to
ipake his computations

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 172-177, 183-185).

Mr.

Luedtke entered testimony to the effect that the opacity from steam
plumes at the Fry Company can be read

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 193-194).

He testified that he had personally read many plumes with the same
operation as the Fry Roofing Company, where the opacity was well in
excess of the Ringelmann No. 2

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 196). On cross-

examination Mr. Luedtke testified as to the identical process between
Fry Roofing Compamy in Woods Cross and the celotex plant in Los
Angeles, California

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 201-203).

From the calcu-

lations and the psychometric chart, Mr. Luedtke came to the conclusion that significant amounts of dry particulate were coming from
the Fry stacks, in addition to the amount of water vapor which
was dissipated.

His testimony affirmed the position that smoke

readers can make a determination of dry particulate by reading
beyond the breakpoint

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 174-178, 183-187).

The data furnished to Carl D. Luedtke was supplied by Mr.
Mostyn and Mr. Donald Foster of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company.
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 173-174)

Mr. Luedtke's calculations were based

upon ideal atmospheric conditions and he testified to scientific and
experimental evidence which was framed within the reasonable probability, based upon sufficient preliminary facts, to make an expert
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opinion

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 171-180).

Mr. Luedtke compared his ob-

servations and calculations at the Lloyd A. Fry Company with similar
asphalt roofing plants to arrive at his conclusions.

He made

reasonable inferences from his personal observations and communications with the officials of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company (Tr. Vol. II,
pp. 193-203; Bol. I, pp. 223-225; Dr. Parker's testimony of similar
processes at Dugway Proving Grounds).
On September 5, 1973, Alvin Rickers, Brent Bradford and Lynn
Price of the Air Quality Section were invited to visit the Fry Plant
where they observed the operation of the plant.

They observed the

emissions from the process when the felt sheet was passing through
the asphalt saturators, and also observed such emissions from the
stacks when the felt sheet was "broken" or when the felt was not
passing through the asphalt saturators.

They compared the opacity

of the emissions with the water vapor forced out of the felt and into
the stack and the emissions when the felt was broken without moisture
from the felt as part of the emissions.

The result was an opacity

reading of 35-40% with the felt broken and no water vapor being read
with the emissions

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 65, 66, 87, 243-244, 259, 263).

This sets forth the fact that the water vapor did not interfere with
the taking of an opacity reading of the emissions and refutes the
Fry position that the readings were of water vapor with its alleged
masking effect on emissions.
It also is interesting to notice that Donald Foster, who was
called by the Fry Company, is in no position to make a determination
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as to the opacity of the plume, since he is not a qualified smoke
reader and has not had experience with visible emissions readings.
Mr. Foster never took any readings of the opacity of the

Fry plumes.

He argued that the Fry Company was in compliance with the EPA
Weight Emission Regulations; however, Fry is not charged under those
regulations.

No evidence was presented by the Fry Company to refute

the visible emissions regulations of the Air Quality Section.
On October 18, 1973, Mr. Donald Foster testified before the
Utah Air Conservation Committee, where he stated that the Woods
Cross plant is identical with all the other Fry Plants throughout
the United States, which includes 24 other plants at different locations.

The plume from the Fry Roofing Company at Woods Cross

does not differ from plumes of other particulate and steam sources
as far as the visual evaluation is concerned.

It can be determined

where the steam ceases to be a part of the plume and the evaluations,
all made beyond this point, include opacity caused by particulates
alone.
The testimony of Mr. Foster, with regard to uncombined water,
made sense.

He testified as follows:

"Oil and water does not mix. We have uncombined
water in our plume. We have a physical mixture,- yes,
going up the stack, but at some point out here, all
of the water evaporates. The gas as it is driven off
or the plume as it is driven off as a gas condenses.
It may be a particulate at that time, but it f s clear
out here at some point well beyond the lip of the
stack from 30 to 100 feet, at least." (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 158).
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Mr. Foster further testified that no uncombined water was observable
in the plume at the Fry Roofing Company.

If this is the case, then

the entire plume would have to be composed of particulate matter.
This would place Fry Roofing Company all the more clearly in direct
violation of the Visible Emissions Regulations.
It is interesting to note that all of the states in the United
States have visible emissLons regulations.

It is further interesting

to note the Idaho regulations for the control of smoke and visible
emissions.

Section 4 of the "Regulation for Control of Smoke and

•

Other Visible Emissions" for the state of Idaho reads as follows:

"The density or opacity of an air contaminant
shall be measured at the point of its emission, if
observable, and if not, shall be measured at an observable point on the plume nearest the point of
emission. When water particulate contributes to the
opacity of a visible emission, the measurement shall
be made immediately beyond the point where the
water particulate dissipates and no longer contributes to the opacity."

Thos emission regulation obviously sets forth the principle of
a dissipation or breakpoint in wet plumes.

The State of South

Carolina adopted Regulation No. 2.6, entitled "Air Pollution Control
Standards—Standard No. I—Smoke Emission."

Section I of this

regulation deals with existing sources, and Section II deals with new
sources.

Section 1(B) reads as follows:

"Smoke, exclusive of condensed water vapor, from
fuel burning shall not obscure an observer's view to
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a degree as great as or greater than does smoke
designated as No. 1 on the Ringelmann Chart."

Once again, the South Carolina statute makes a clear distinction
that a smoke reader can observe a defined breakpoint, exclusive
of condensed water vapor, at which he can make a visible emission
reading.

The State of Texas adopted a visible emissions regulation

under Rule 103 of the Texas "Regulation I Control of Air Pollution
from Smoke, Visible Emissions and Particulate Matter."

Rule 103.7

reads as follows:

"Contributions from uncombined water shall not
be included in determining compliance with Rule 103.
The burden of proof which establishes the applicability
of Rule 103.7 shall be upon the person seeking to come
within its provisions."

You will notice from the Texas regulation that uncombined water
can be separated from the dry particulate in making a visible
emission reading.

It is the burden of proof of the person charged

to come forward to establish that he is in compliance with the
regulation.
Finally, Mr. Raymond L. Chaffin was also called to testify
by the Fry Company, yet he denied his own expertise in reading
wet plumes.

Mr. Chaffin indicated that he could only read dry plumes

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 7 1 ) . He indicated that he had not been trained
at the EPA school; therefore, he was in no position to make a determination that Fry was in compliance with Section 312 of the Visible
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Emissions Regulations (Tr. Vol. II, p. 73).

Mr. Chaffin's

readings at the Fry plant were made, as mentioned before, when the
sun was in his eyes, in direct violation of the standard procedure
prescribed by the Environmental Protection Agency (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 86,92) .

This would have made any readings he had taken inaccurate,

because the sun was in his eyes and not at the appropriate angle for
taking his readings.

Mr. Chaffin further testified that the steam

coming from the stack condenses immediately to water and that, the
plume is composed entirely of steam (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 102-103).
This would indicate that no plume could, in fact, exist.

If a

plume were to be observed beyond the condensation point out of the
stacks of the Fry plant, their plumes would have to be composed
of dry particulate to satisfy the explanation given by Mr. Chaffin.

-24Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT I
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE HAS MET ITS
BURDEN IN PROVING THAT THE LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING
COMPANY HAS VIOLATED SECTION 3.2 OF THE VISIBLE
EMISSIONS REGULATIONS.
The decision of the Utah Air Conservation Committee was based
upon a finding of substantial evidence introduced at the hearing.
It found that contaminant was discharged into the atmosphere, and
that such contaminant was either of a shade as dark or darker than
a Ringelmann No. 2 or that it obstructed the vision of smoke readers
at least as much as would the smoke that was as dark as a Ringelmann
No. 2.
In People v. Plywood Manufacturers of California, 137 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955), the court held that the burden of
proof in prosecution

of a violation was upon the state.

The elements

of proof were held to be as follows:
"(1) that it was a contaminant that was discharged into
the atmosphere, and (2) that the contaminant was either
(a) of a shade as dark or darker than Ringelmann No. 2,
or (b) that it obstructed the vision at least as much
as would smoke that was as dark as Ringelmann No. 2."
Id., at 594.
In this case, the Superior Court of California held that the "antismog" statute was not invalid because of objections urged against it.
It also decided that the word "opacity" in the statute meant "want of
transparency."
The Utah Air Conservation Committee is not required to establish
a continuous violation, but rather that violations were observed on
the different days listed by the various smoke readers.
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In People v.

International Steel Corporation, 102 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 935, 226
P.2d 587 (1951), the court held the above-mentioned standard was
sufficiently definite to satisfy the due process of law.
Furthermore, in Plywood Manufacturing, supra, the court saw
no difficulty arising from the fact that a plume of smoke may
appear less dark than Ringelmann No. 2 from one position, but
darker from another viewpoint.

They held that if the contaminant

has the substance that, fairly viewed from any position, gives it
a shade as dark or darker than Ringelmann No. 2, it is condemned,
no matter how light in color it may look to someone situated at
another vantage point*

Supra, at 591.

Each individual state has the responsibility of implementing
certain air quality standards described in the National Evnironmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §1847 c-2 (a) .

In compliance with

this federal directive, the Utah State Implementation Plan set forth
certain emission limitations.

In accordance with E.P.A. procedures,

the smoke readers made objective readings and complied with the requirements of due process.

Each and every reader found numerous

violations of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company on the date in question and testified as to their procedure in taking these readings.
They were taken under the best conditions which were available on the
dates in question.
Each reader testified that at the time the readings were taken,
they had no difficulty in ascertaining where the breakpoint was, and
that their readings were made of the contaminant which continued
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In State v. Lloyd A, Fry Roofing Company, 9 Ore. App. 189,
495 P. 2d 751 (1972), remanded on other grounds,
502 P. 2d 253 (1972), opinion reinstated in full,

Ore.

_,

Ore. App.

,

502 P. 2d 1162 (1972), the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company was indicted
on four counts of air pollution in violation of the rules of the
local air pollution agency.

The court held that the evidence con-

cerning the defendant's alleged violations was correctly assessed,
and applicable statutes and regulations were properly interpreted. .
The court further held that the state's evidence in the form of
testimony and records of the smoke readers, certified as such just
prior to making the readings in question, was admissible, and such
evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.

The court held

that the two witnesses held sufficient qualifications to determine
obscuration of background caused by emissions from defendant's plant.
The decision further stated

the law does not require that in

order to qualify as an expert, the witness be better qualified than
anyone else, but only that he has sufficient expertise to make it
probable that he will aid the jury in its search for truth.

The

trial court's determination as to whether a witness is competant will
not be upset, except upon a clear abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, there has been no showing of any clear abuse
of discretion, the same as in the Oregon case above cited.

The Ore-

gon case showed that there was no clear abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of smoke readings made by two agency employees who had
undergone two days' training and had been certified just shortly
before making Digitized
the readings,
even
though
plume
at the defendant's
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reubenthe
Clark Law
School, BYU.
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plant was a "wet" plume.

The readers had only been given practical

training in reading "dry" plumes, receiving only instruction on the
reading of "wet" ones.

In the instant case, the Utah readers had

been throughly trained, certified, and had years of experience in
reading both types of plumes.

No cases have indicated the amount of

experience, training or education which is required to establish the
competency of the witnesses.
In the instant case, no testimony was given about the variables
which may affect a smoke reading, nor was there testimony offered to
refute the results of the smoke reader's findings.

The Utah smoke

readers were subjected to many variables during their smoke school
training, and received detailed instruction on wet plumes.
Basic or essential findings upon which administrative orders
rest must be clearly and completely shown in findings based on
substantial evidence.

Cities Service Gas Company v. State Corporation

Commission, 201 Kan. 223, 440 P.2d 660 (1968).

The finding of the

Utah Air Conservation Committee was based upon substantial evidence
as set forth at the hearing.

The Committee was authorized to issue

such orders as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
Air Conservation Act and to enforce the same by all appropriate administrative and judicial proceedings.

See, Section 26-24-5.

This

was an administrative hearing which resulted in a final order being
issued by the committee to the appellant to either .seek a variance
as outlined in the act or cease and desist.

This action was based
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upon a finding of substantial evidence.
The question of whether or not there was presented to an administrative agency in a quasi-judicial proceeding sufficient evidence
of a violation of rules and regulations pertaining to air pollution
as would warrant the issuance by the agency of an order to cease and
desist or otherwise abate the violative practices is the real question.

The decision of an administrative tribunal must be supported

by evidence of probative

value, and if such evidence is apparent

to a review in court, the court will not substitute its own judicial determination on the facts.
tion 393.

See 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Sec-

As proof of the violation itself, it has been held that

a preponderance of the evidence, and not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, is all that is required.
v

See North American Coal Corporation

- Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa. Cnwlth. 469, 279 A.2d 365 (1971).

Where an administrative agency is concerned with technical matters,
the court will give weight to its presumed expertise in reviewing
decisions, and stating as applicable the rule that the court will
not overturn an administrative decision if it appears to be supported by substantial evidence on the record.

Evidence consisting of

testimony by several witnesses who live near the defendant manufacturing plant that fumes and smoke coming from the plant had caused
them poor health and discomfort, along with the testimony of an
expert witness who was the enforcement officer for the commission
as to certain observations and tests made upon several occasions

-29Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at the manufacturing plant was held sufficient in Department of
Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 100 N.J. Super. 366,
242 A.2d 21 (1968),Affirmed, 53 N.J. 248, 250 A.2d 11 (1970).
The court, in North American Coal, supra, stated that when
visual tests are used to determine the amount of emission, great
pains should be taken to make sure that the tests are made accurately and fairly and that sufficient proof to sustain the opinions
of the experts is presented.

This court took the positon that the

comparitive degree of proof by which a case must be determined in
an administrative hearing is the same as in a civil judicial proceeding; that is, a preponderance of the evidence, and notwithstanding that the defendant was charged with a violation of the
commission's regulations, proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not
be required.

It also concluded that visual tests do constitute

admissible evidence sufficient to warrant the granting of an abatement order.
In Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 111. App. 3d 711,
292 N.E.2d 540 (1973), the appellate court held that penalty powers
given the Pollution Control Board of the State of Illinois weyre
incidental to its duties of administering the Environmental Control
Act and did not constitute a prohibited grant of judicial power.
In this decision the appellate court held that an administrative
officer or agency may penalize, without offending the constitution,
when the penal function is incidental to the duty of administering
the law.

The Illinois Environmental Control Act provisions authorize
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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deprive the penalized party of its constitutional right to a jury
trial (see argument V ) .

It is essential to note that the Illinois

statute on violations and penalties is similar to the section in
the Utah Code.

In the proceedings for the enforcement of the

Environmental Control Act, the court held that the board need only
establish a prima facie case of violation and does not have an additional burden of introducing proof relative to each of the factors
contained in the statutes setting forth what the board shall consider in making its orders and determinations.

Where the board has

made a prima facie case of violation of the Environmental Control
Act, the alleged violator has the burden of going forward to establish the reasonableness of the emissions, discharges or deposits.
The court went on to state that it was not necessary for the commission or board to make particular findings as to every evidentiary
fact or claim, and it was sufficient that findings were made which
were adequate to support the order of the board, and that such
findings had substantial foundation in evidence.

It is interesting

to note that the burden of proof of the reasonableness of the emissions,
discharges or deposits rests with the defendant; or in this case,
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company.
In the case of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Pollution
Control Board, 20 111. App.3d 301, 314 N.E.2d 350 (1974), the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that the charges in the administrative proceeding need not be drawn with the same refinement as
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pleadings in a court of law, but the charges must be sufficiently
clear and specific to allow preparation of a defense.

The court

further held that the compliance with the regulations of the Pollution Control Board is a prima facie defense to charges of violating the act, but is not a complete defense.

The Lloyd A. Fry

Roofing Company made no attempt, in the instant case, to establish compliance with the regulations of the State.

The appellate

court, in the Illinois decision, found that the Lloyd A. Fry
Company had causedair pollution as defined by the act and had emitted particulates into the air in amounts exceeing the limits set
forth in the rules and regulations governing control of air pollution.
The Pollution Control Board of Illinois made its determination
after due consideration of written and oral statements, testimony
and arguments submitted at hearing.

The court held that its posi-

tion is to examine the findings of the administrative agency to
determine if they are supported by sufficient competent evidence.
The Utah Air Conservation Committee submits that this is the duty
of the Utah Supreme Court, to review the findings of the Committee
to make a determination if they are supported by sufficient and
competent evidence.
The Utah Air Conservation Committee is not required to show
that injury to an individual or members of the public has occurred.
The purpose of the Visible Emissions Regulations adopted by the
Utah Air Conservation Committee is to assure that the Federal Ambient
Air Standards are not violated in order to assure that human health
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is protected.

The burden of the committee is merely to show that

a public right has been invaded, namely, the right to breathe clean
air.

The public right threatened with this kind of an invasion

must be substantial.

The case of City of Chicago, et. al. v.

Gunning System, 214 111. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905) declared as
unreasonable an ordinance which controlled the use of billboards.
The court, in the form of dictum, stated:
"The one essential and universal limitation upon the
exercise of the police power is, however, that the
regulation shall be reasonably necessary and reasonably exercised." IcL , at 1040.
The court also stated as follows:
"In determining first whether this act is a
constitutional exercise of the police power, we
are cognizant that the criteria of a proper exercise of the police power, that inherent and plenary
power of the legislature to protect public health,
safety and general welfare, . . # is whether the
statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils
which the legislature has determined exist."
The court emphasized the theory that the public possesses a trust
in natural resources.

Whenever the environment is degraded, a

public right (public trust) has been invaded.
Section 26-24-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), states
the definition of "air pollution" to be a condition in the ambient air
where air contaminants in such quantities and duration and under certain conditions and circumstances tend to be injurious to human
health or welfare.

The Utah Air Conservation Committee has set

forth certain visible emissions regulations to insure the public
that contaminant levels will not get to a point where they will
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the opacity of the smoke plumes of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company
to be emitting contaminants to a level beyond the
limitations.

emission

These readings, in and of themselves, set forth a

prima facie case that the emissions from the Lloyd A, Fry plant
are at a level which tend to be injurious to human health or
welfare.

POINT II
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE
UTAH AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE ARE BASED UPON
SUBSTANTIAL AND FACTUAL EVIDENCE WHICH PROVIDED
THE LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY WITH ADEQUATE
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The Utah Air Conservation Committee made its determination
after due consideration of written and oral statements, testimony and arguments submitted at the hearing.

The administrative

procedure allowed the hearing officers to make a determination
and appraise the evidence.

In State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing

Company, supra, the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that the
air pollution authority's

intent to define the term "opacity11

as the reduction of transmitted light and obscuraction of background, including the concept of "equivalent opacity," meaning
white smoke which obscures more than 40% of the background is
equivalent to smoke as dark or darker in shade as that designated
in No. 2 on the Ringelmann Chart (used to measure black or gray
smoke), and such rules, were not so vague and arbitrary as to
violate constitutional standards controlling the validity of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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such legislation.

There was no clear abuse of discretion in

admitting evidence of smoke readings made by the two agency
employees recently certified as smoke readers, even though the
plume at the Fry plant was a "wet" plume and the reader's
instruction had not been practical, but theoretical.

The decision

clearly held that there is no need for experience in reading
wet plumes in order to make one's determination as to the opacity
of dry particulate out of such plumes.
The appellants allege in their brief that there was no
showing that the operation at the Oregon plant was the same as
that of the Woods Cross plant, in reference to the above-cited
case.

The fact is that the Lloyd A. Fry Company has 24 plants

in the United States, all of which are identical in process and
operation with the Woods

Cross plant.

Mr. Donald Foster testi-

fied to this at the Utah Air Conservation Committee meeting on
October 18, 1973.
In this same Oregon decision, the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company challenged the Columbia-Williamette Air Pollution Authority
in that their regulations were vague and arbitrary, so as to violate the constitutional standards controlling the validity of such
legislation.^

The court interpreted the concept of equivalent

opacity to be constitutional.

The Lloyd A. Fry Company made the

argument that equivalent opacity measures one factor only, of a
definition which requires that two factors be considered.

These

factors were the transmission of light and the background visibility.
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reduction of light and obscuration of background.

The court

further held that this was the agency's clear intent and upheld
the equivalent opacity to be constitutional.
Another concern that the appellant in the instant case has
expressed is the alleged subjectivity of the procedure involved.
Each of the state's smoke readers has been trained, certified,
and retrained in smoke schools offered by the state.

Each had

qualified under strict federal standards (40 C.F.R. 60) and had
passed the tests for certification.

Each smoke reader has further

received field training to become specialized and skilled in
reading "wet" plumes, as well as dry.
The fact that a difference in readings has occurred does not
destroy the validity of each individual reading.
equates individuality with subjectivity.
soning.

Appellant

This is fallacious rea-

Of course, each official or smoke reader, being an indiv-

idual would have unique background, experience, and perception.

That

is why the consistency of the observed violations on many different
occasions by five different men is so remarkable.

It testifies

affirmatively about the smoke school training and the vast experience of these men.
A building inspector may detect a warp in a wall, roof, or a
foundation which an ordinary person would not have seen; yet it may
be potentially harmful to those occupying the building, or a

meat

inspector may notice a slight discoloration in a cut of beef that
would render it harmful to human life, yet he is just one of many
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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inspectors.

Does this mean that his visual perceptions are suspect

or that new and expensive equipment is required? No.
There was nothing even remotely haphazard or unskilled about
the manner in which the evaluations by the statefs observers were
made.

Evidence was presented as to the experience of each one and

it was never challenged.
and fair fashion.

The readings were done in a reasonable

E?ch observer testified that he took into account

the numerous variables that could have altered the accuracy of his
record.
The readings of the various smoke readers indicated that they
read the plume at right angles and with the sun at their backs as
much as would permit for best conditions to make the readings.

The

transcript of the hearing indicated that Richard Harvey read the
plume at right angles (Tr. Vol. I, p.153) and that William Terburg
also read the plume at right angles (Tr. Vol. 1/ pp.120, 149).
George Chlarson appears to have been the most capable individual
at reading smoke as a result of his qualifications at the smoke
school.

He read 25 consecutive readings without error

I, pp. 72-73) .

(Tr. Vol.

In the testimony of William Terburg, there was no

showing that the sun was not to his back, and, in fact, he testified that the sun probably had no effect on his reading.

Al Rickers,

who is a qualified meteorolgist, testified as to his extensive experience in taking 150 to 175 readings of smoke plumes (Tr. Vol I.,
p. 56)

Mr. Rickers further testified that the student who qualifies

at the smoke school have a reading variation which runs about 1%
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Each reader in this case was certified and complied with procedure by presenting an appropriate Fry Company official with
notice of violation, and each properly recorded, in memorandum
form, the details of the observations for future reference.

,

No evidence was presented by the appellant to show that this
regular procedure was ineffective or that the observers required,
re-calibration of their eyeballs at the time of their readings*
The current procedure is reliable and eminently satisfactory.
It should be evident that the smoke plumes which the inspectors observed are not, and are not required to be, evidence in this
case.

Rather, the evidence which was available to the state here

and in all cases with reppect to visible emission violations would
consist of the inspector's trained observations and his field
report whereon he recorded all the elements necessary for an accurate opacity reading.
In the City of Portland v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company,
3 Ore. App. 352, 472 P.2d 826 (1970) the defendant then, as does
the appellant now, claimed subjectivity in enforcement; that the
"guilt or innocence of defendant (was) dependent upon the whims
and vagaries of opinion testimony produced by officers of the
enforcing agencies.11 Supra, at 828.

The court found this contention,

invalid, unpersuasive, and firmly rejected it.
%he court, in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Pollution Control Board, supra, held that the Environmental Protection Act of
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Illinois was not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite for failure
to scientifically delineate all types of contaminants and pollution.
Rather, it held that the authority and power bestowed on the Pollution Control Board to make rules and adjudicate cases are in keeping
with the spirit of the act, for practical application and operation
of the act, and that the act did not confer unlimited jurisdictional
discretion, and judicial power upon the Board, inasmuch as discretion and power is clearly limited by statutory requirement that the
Board determine standards.

The court went on to say that the Environ-

mental Protection Act of Illinios was not applied in a capricious or
arbitrary manner on the theory that the

actions for violations of

the act could be brought against persons, even though they may be in
compliance with regulations and even though the Act states that compliance with regulations is a prima facie defense to an action, in
view of the provision of the act that violations of it occur whenever
a person causes or tends to cause air pollution "or" violates the
rules and regulations adopted by the Pollution Control Board.
With regard to the issues of evidence, the Court held that
failure to observe the technical rules of evidence was not sufficient reason to set aside an administrative agency's decision unless the error materially affected the rights of the party and resulted in substantial injustice to him.

The court stated that the

admission of incompetent evidence before the Pollution Control
Board is not reversible error if there is substantial evidence to
sustain the decision.

On the other hand, the court held that the
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pollution by the manufac-

turer of the a'sphalt roofing in violation of the Environmental
Protection Act was supported by substantial, competent evidence
showing unreasonable interference with life and property.

In the

case at bar, the Utah Air Conservation Committee took into consideration all the facts and circumstances from the hearing upon the
reasonableness of the emissions and found that the Lloyd A. Fry
Company had failed to demonstrate any compliance with the Visible
Emissions Regulations and that they further caused the emission
of contaminants to the extent to be beyond the emissions limitations set forth by the Utah Air Conservation Committee.
The appellant brings forward the case of Bortz Coal Company
v. Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa. Cmwlth. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971).
Actually, the Bortz decision is highly favorable to the State.

The

court rejected contentions that the pollution statute constituted
an unlawful delegation of legislative authority and that the
enforcement of the rules and regulations was a confiscation of property without the due process of law.

It found that the evidence

was not sufficient to uphold an abatement order.

The facts, how-

ever, quickly demonstrate the difference between the Bortz case
and the one before this court.

Of the four witnesses in the Bortz

decision, two were housewives who complained of dirt and soot, and
only one was an air pollution expert.

There was no indication in

the record that he was qualifed as a smoke reader.

He had made

observations from which he not only asserted an opacity violation,
. — -»
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but also claimed the coke ovens in question emitted more than 45
pounds of particulate matter per hour from each oven.

The smoke

emitted was black; therefore, a Ringelmann Chart could have been
useful, while in the instant case, the observers were reading
white plumes.

The chart would not have added anything to the

accuracy in any scientific manner, since the readers were determining an equivalent opacity, on the Fry stacks.

The Bortz abate-

ment order was based on the casual observation of one employee.
The order of the Utah Air Conservation Committee was based not only
upon the careful observations of trained and recertified smoke
readers, but expert testimony as to their abilities and capabilities.
Appellants further sited the case of Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C# Cir. 1973).

The Portland Cement decision

relied on by appellant Fry Roofing Company to question the visible
observation method can easily be distinguished.

The court was

addressing itself to a proposed Environmental Protection Agency
10% opacity standard for new stationary sources of particulate
matter, while in the instant case the concern before this court is
a violation by an existing stationary source of a more liberal amount
or standard of 40% for existing sources.

The court also seemed to

express the belief that the present opacity standard of at least 20%
(for new sources) was quite reliable and only expressed concern for
reasonable accuracy at minimal levels at or below 10%. This same
argument applies to the additional decision cited by appellant in
Essex Chemical v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir". 1973).
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POINT III
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION ACT PROVIDES FOR
ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Smoke control regulations, whether directly prohibiting the
emission of smoke or regulating the supply and use of smokeproducing fuel, have ordinarily been held valid as a proper exercise of the police power*

The typical smoke regulation is regarded

as reasonable and does not violate due process or constitutional
provisions against discriminatory legislation or, applied to interstate or foreign commerce, the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The terms used in smoke control regulations, such as
"dense smoke" or a reference to the Ringelmann Chart as published
by the United States Bureau of Mines (defining degrees of darkness)
are not so indefinite as to render the regulation invalid.
Regulations for the control of the emission of smoke or the
use of smoke-creating fuel, have

ordinarily been held valid, or

at least, not invalid on their face.

The general rule is that

the question of the reasonableness of an act otherwise within constitutional bounds is for the legislature exclusively, and that in
ordinary cases the courts have no revisory power concerning it nor
any power to substitute their own opinion for the judgment of the
legislature.

The courts inquire whether a statute is arbitrary or

capricious, that is, whether it is

reasonably necessary and appro-

priate for the accomplishment of the legitimate objects falling
within the scope of the police power of the state,"then the validity
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of the exercise of such power is valid.

Statutes, ordinances, and

administrative rules and regulations (issued under the authority of
appropriate statutes), dealing with the control of smoke or other
air pollution, have ordinarily been held reasonable, or at least,
not unreasonable on their face.

State ex r e L Hainsworth v. Shannon,

130 Mo. App. 90, 108 S.W. 1097 (1908); Rochester v. Macauley-Fien
Milling Company, 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910); People v. Tadge,
203 Misc. 949, 121 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Allegheny County v. Toth, 189 Pa. Super. 552, 152 A.2d 284 (1959).
Smoke control regulations have ordinarily been held not to
violate the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

This is so, even though such a regulation disturbs the

full enjoyment of a personal right without providing compensation
therefor.

Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942);

State v. Chicago, M.& St.Pr.Co., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911).
It is a general principle of statutory law that a statute must be
definite to be valid.

A statute which either forbids or requires

the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of

the due process of law.

Regu-

lations for the control of smoke and other forms of air pollution
have been upheld against the attack that their language was so vague
and indefinite as to deprive the regulations of their validity.
People v. International Steel Corporation, supra; People v. Plywood
Manufacturers of California, supra.

In the case of People v. Plywood
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anti-

smog" statute was constitutionally valid and satified the demands
of due process because the legislature, in drafting the statute,
took the sound premise that smoke that was as dark or darker than
Ringelmann No. 2 obstructed the view to an identifiable degree that
would serve as a standard for the statute.
In People v. International Steel Corporation, supra, the court
held that the statute for the control of air pollution, which prohibits the discharge into the atmosphere from any single source of
emission, within certain time limits, of smoke "as dark or darker
in shade as that designated in No. 2 on the Ringelmann Chart, as
published by the U.S. Bureau of Mines," was held not subject to the
objection that it was fatally uncertain because it set
ascertainable standard of guilt.

forth no

A definition of density or dark-

ness of smoke by reference to the Ringelmann Chart published by the
U.S. Bureau of Mines is not subject to the objection that it is invalid on the ground of vagueness.

The court in both cases rejected

the contention that the statute was unconstitutional because the
ordinary person, having no special training, would not be able to
tell whether his smoke is as dark as Ringelmann No. 2 or whether its
opacity equals that of smoke that matches Ringelmann No. 2.

The

court pointed out that while a statute is invalid if its terms
leave that which it attempts to control shrouded in uncertainty, a
statute which declares an act identified with certainty to be unlawful, is not rendered unconstitutional because the act, as a fact,
may not be readily identifiable by the common man as "that forbidden
bV t h e

Statute.
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of the facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed
and the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality
is cast upon the assailant.

Board of Health v. New York Central

Railroad Company, 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511 (1950).
Regulations of smoke and other forms of air pollution have
ordinarily been held not to violate the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws or restricting special legislation nor to be otherwise discriminatory so as to be
invalid.

People v. International Steel Corporation, supra.

A

smoke control regulation is not discriminatory so as to be invalid
where it applies to all coming within its terms. A smoke control
statute is not discriminatory because under it one who discharges
an air contaminant only slightly below the prescribed limit of color
copacity is exempt from the prohibition, even though if he continues
his operation long enough he will discharge more contaminant into
the air than one who continues for only a short time beyond the
three-minute minimum permitted in the statute.

People v. International

Steel Corporation, supra.
The discretion exercised by a legislature within its power is
not subject to judicial control unless it involves a violation of
some right protected by the constitution, a fundamental right.

In

this respect, courts have pointed out that a statute for the control
of air pollution is a proper exercise of the police power with the
discretion of the administrative body enforcing it, and that an act
of the legislature
is not to be declared void by the court unless the
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violation of the constitution leaves no room for reasonable doubt.
St. Louis v, Edward Heitzberg Packing and Provision Company, 141 Mo.
375, 42 S.W. 954 (1897); Atlantic City v. France, 75 N.-J.L. 910,
70 A. 163 (1908).

The courts have shifted the burden to the defendant

to prove the unreasonableness of an ordinance or regulation.

Pre-

sumption is in favor of the validity of such rule or regulation,
and the defendant has the burden to establish it as unreasonable.
The defendant has a further burden to show the impossibility of his
compliance with such ordinance.

People v. Tadje, supra; Cincinnati

v. Miller, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 788, 29 W.L. Bull. 364 (1893);
Oswald v. Christy, 112 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1952 Supp.)
A statute ia the State of California, referring to "excessive
smoke" was held not so indefinite, uncertain and vague that it
failed to inform an average, intelligent person what acts or omissions are prohibited, or to fix any standard of guilt, since the
requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of
ordinary terms to express ideas of common usage.

The visible

emissions regulations are much clearer than the definition of
"excessive smoke" used in the California statute, and yet the
"excessive smoke" statute was held to be constitutional and within
the perameters of due process of law.

Myriads of cases have upheld

the validity of the use of the Ringelmann Chart in ascertaining the
opacity of a smoke plume.

A county Pollution control ordinance was

not held unconstitutional where there was a definite relationship
between public health and welfare being protected under the ordinDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the atmosphere, and where

standards setting forth maximum allowable emission of smoke and
particulate matter, including the use of the Ringelmann Chart,
were easily ascertainable from the language of the Code.
v. Coral Gables, 230 2nd So.7 (Fla. App. 1969).

Miami

In a Michigan

decision, the ambiguity in the definition of "smoke" in the city
air pollution control ordinance would not bar its application
where the defendant's smoke emissions were fcund to be darker
than permissible, comparing them with the Ringelmann Chart density
No. 2. People v. Detroit Edison Company, 16 Mich. App. 423, 168
N.W. 2d 320 (1969); Bortz Coal Company v. Air Pollution Commission,
supra.

Lloyd A. Fry Company v. Department of Health, 179 Colo. 223,

499 P.2d 1176 (1972) held that the smoke control regulations of the
State of Colorado do not violate the due process of law.

The court

upheld the validity of the regulations against an attack that the
language is so vague and indefinite as to rob the regulations of
their validity.

In City of Portland v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Com-

pany, supra, the city ordinance using the Ringelmann Chart as the
standard in controlling air contamination was constitutional.

It

established a standard of guilt ascertainable to persons of common
intelligence, contained standards likely or calculated to produce
uniform application, and did not make guilt or innocence of the
defendant dependent upon whims and vagaries of opinion testimony
produced by officers of the enforcing agency.

In the same case,

the definition of opacity by the air pollution authority, in terms
. — »
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merely stated the same concept in two ways, as previously mentioned.
In the above-cited cases, the equivalent opacity method did not
require the use of the Ringelmann Chart in the field, because the
chart was designed for black smoke and the observer at the smoke
school is also trained to read the equivalent opacity of white
smoke.

Reading equivalent opacity without the aid of the Ringelmann

Chart is a valid method of reading smoke plumes.

State v. Lloyd A.

Fry Roofing Company, supra, at 753-754.
Finally, in the decision of Department of Health v. OwensCorning Fiberqlas Corporation, supra, the

New Jersey Air Pollution

Control Act was held to be not invalid, in that it lacked specificity in failing to inform the defendant with particularity as to
the nature of the offending activity where such activity was "air
pollution11 which was properly defined in the act.
It is interesting to take notice that all states have visible
emission statutes similar to those of the State of Utah, and none
of these statutes has ever been declared unconstitutional.

The

violation of Section 3.2.1 of the Visible Emissions Regulations
does not create an "irrebuttable presumption," rather a rebuttable one
is presented.

The rebuttable presumption is that the degree of

opacity in the Fry plumes, when darker than Ringelmann No. 2 (40%
opacity) is proof that "air pollution" exists.
allows for the exception of uncombined water.

Section 3.2.6(d)
This allows the

aggrieved party great latitude to present evidence that water vapor
formed a portion of the observed plume, as in this case.

The appel-

lant, however, has failed to establish this burden of proof.
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Company has neglected to present even a single case to support its
bold assertion of unconstitutionality.

Since every state in the

country has visible emission statutes, the dearth of case law
favoring the Fry position speaks resoundingly against it.
POINT IV
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION ACT IS A LAWFUL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER TO THE
UTAH AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF CARRYING OUT ITS ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION.
Since administrative agencies are purely creatures of legislation, without inherent or common-law powers, the general rule
applied to statutes granting powers to them is that only those
powers are granted which are conferred either expressly or by
necessary implication.
(1932).

State v. Goss, 79 Utah 599, 111 P.2d 340

Statutes authorizing the State Board of Health to make

rules limited to matters respecting duties imposed upon the board
with respect to particular subjects or situations are held valid.
Id. Where administrative powers are granted for the purpose of
effectuating broad regulatory programs which are deemed to be essential to the public welfare, interpretive attention may concentrate on
remedial character of the legislation to produce a liberal interpretation that enables the full benefits of the program to be realized.
This approach has been taken consistently with respect to the statutes
granting powers to boards of health.
struction, 4th Ed. §65.03.

3 Southerland, Statutory Con-

The public and social purposes served

by health legislation greatly exceeds the inconvenience and hardthe Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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given greater* emphasis in the problems of interpretation*

The courts

are inclined to give health statutes liberal interpretation despite
the fact that such statutes may be penal in nature and frequently
may impose criminal penalties.
Every presumption will be indulged in favor of constitutionality,
and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of validity.
Packer Corporation, 77 U. 500, 297 P.2d 1013 (1931).

State v.

When legislative

action is within the scope of the police power, fairly debatable

ques-

tions as to reasonableness, wisdom and propriety are not for the
courts, but for the legislature.

Standard Oil Company v. Marysvale,

279 U.S. 582, 49 S.Ct. 430, 73 L.Efl. 856 (1928).

The Utah Supreme

Court; in the case of Goodrich v. Public Service Commission, 114 U.
296, 198 P.2d 975 (1948), declared it was cognizant of the duties
and prerogatives conferred upon the Division of Health by the statutes
referred to in UCA, § 26-15-1 to 26-15-5 (1953, as amended), in that
•in fulfilling those responsibilities, .the Division of Health should
be allowed considerable latitude of discretion.
The state legislatures may provide for the execution of their
policies through administrative agencies by conferring specific duties
and powers.

The Utah Supreme Court in two cases held as follows:

"It (legislature) may, however, provide for the execution
through administrative agencies of its legislative policy and
may confer upon such administrative officers certain powers
and the duty of determining the question of the existence of
certain facts upon which the effect or execution of its legislative policy may be dependent. Rowell v. State Board of
Agriculture, 98 U. 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940); see also, McGreu v.
Industrial Commission, 96 U. 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938); Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1937).
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determine questions of fact. Any discretion left to the administrative officer is left to the application of the rules of reason
to facts proven or found.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that a

statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect may be given it. Norville v. State Tax
Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P.2d 937 (1940); State v. Packer Corporation, 77 U. 500, 297 P. 1013 (1931); State v. Packer Corporation, 78 U. 177, 2 P12d 114 (1931); Packer Corporation v. State,
285 U.S. 105, 52 S.Ct. 273, 76 L.Ed. 643 )1931).

In Revna v. Trade

Commission, 113 U. 155, 192 P.2d 563 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court
held as follows:

^

"We recognize, of course, that the legislature
may properly delegate to some administrative body the
duty of ascertaining the facts upon which the provisions
of a law are to function, and also, that one of the
methods of initiating activity on the part of the administrative body may be by petition of the citizens concerned. Such procedure is not in and of itself
defective as an improper delegation of legislative
authority. The question of an improper delegation
of legislative authority is embedded in the extent of
the power granted to the administrative body ....Id..,
at 576.

The law referred to in this case was enacted as a health and safety
measure in the interest of the public, and that should govern its
functioning.
The Utah Air Conservation Act sets forth public policy and
purposes very clearly.

It contains guidelines and standards to

direct the Utah Air Conservation Committee in fulfilling its purposes.

Section 26-24-1.5(1) provides the legislature's declara./
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tion of public policy:
"To achieve and maintain such levels of air quality
as will protect human health and safety, and to the
greatest degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and
animal life and property, foster the comfort and convenience of people. . . "
It is clear that this declaration of public policy acts as a
guideline, in and of itself, for the decisions of the air conservation committee.
The Utah Air Conservation Committee is also charged with:
"Air pollution prevention, abatement, and control;
to provide...distribution of responsibility among
state and local units of government... to provide a
framework within which air quality levels may be protected and consideration given to the public interest
at all levels of planning and development within the
state." Section 26-24-1.5(3), Utah Code Annotated,
(1971, as amended).
The declared purpose of the Act is to "secure and maintain
appropriate levels of air quality.

Utah Code Annotated, Section

26-24-1.5(2), (1971, as amended).
The Act provides definitions within which the committee's .
decisions are bounded.

For example, the guidelines provided by the

definition of "air contaminant", 26-24-2(1), demonstrates that the
administrative jurisdiction and discretion of the committee it limited
to specific situations involving "particulate matter, or any gas,
vapor, suspended solids, or combination thereof, excluding steam
and water vapors."
Another standard by which the committee must abide is the restriction inherent in the definition of "air pollution" at UCA Section
26-24-2(3) (1953,
as amended) ;
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of one or more air contaminants in such quantities and
duration -and under such conditions and circumstances as is
or tends to be injurious to human health or welfare,
animal or plant life, or property, or would unreassonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or use
of property as determined by the standards, rules,
and regulations adopted by the Air Conservation
Committee."
Recognizing that further definition and scientific knowledge were beyond its capabilities, the legislature enacted UCA
Section 26-24-10(2), (1971) as amended, which empowered the air conservation committee to:
"establish such emission control requirements,
by rule, regulation or standard, as in its judgment
may be necessary to prevent, abate, or control air
pollution.,f
By adopting such controlling phraseology, the legislature limits
the rules and regulations adopted by the Air Conservation Committee
to those which are necessary.

This guideline was referred to in

the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. State Department of Health,
sppra, at 1180, where the court concluded:
"In cases dealing with other areas of legitimate
legislative activity where precision was determined
to be impossible . . . such broad standards as "reasonable11 or ''necessary" have been found sufficient as
standards, although incapable of precise definition."
It is apparent, therefore, that this section, 26-24-10(2), provides sufficient guidelines and standards as to be within the
bounds of proper legislative delegation of authority.
Additionally, the committee, in adopting standards of air
quality, must conduct public hearings.

It is clear from this

requirement that the legislature has provided for due process in
•.—*

-53-
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the adoption of air quality standards.

UCA §26-24-10 (1) (1971) as amended.

A final example of legislative control of the Air Conservation
Committee is the requirement in § 26-24-5, subsection 18, that any
rules, regulations or standards adopted by the Air Conservation
Committee must be in conformity and consistent with provisions of
federal law.

With the adoption of federal emission controls in

1971, the state legislature found it necessary to delegate the
complex, highly scientific matters of emission controls to a body
capable of implementing federal demands.

This same subsection also

gives the Board of Health broad powers of control over the Air
Conservation Committee, allowing the board the right to:
"amend or modify any action of the committee or
its executive secretary if the board deems such amendment or modification necessary for the protection of
public health."
I

The state legislature has the power, and responsiblity, to

delegate to an administrative agency a reasonable measure of
authority to accomplish the purpose for which the agency was created.
It has long been accepted that the legislature may delegate a "reasonable measure" of its authority which is necessary to accomplish
the constitutional purposes it desires.

Kesler and Sons Construc-

tion Company v. Utah State Division of Health, 30 U.2d 90, 513 P.2d
1019 (1973); see also People ex rel. Curren v. Shaumar, 392 111. 17,
63 N.E.2d 744 (1945).

The delegation of authority from the legis-

lature to an administrative agency is necessary, particularly in
view of the modern multitudinous details of scientific necessity.
Federal InsuranceDigitized
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1# 92 L.Ed. 10 (1943).

This especially true in areas requiring

depth and specialization.

While there may be a question of "degree"

of powers delegated, there is no doubt that the legislature may
delegate to an administrative

agency the exercise of a limited

portion of its legislative power with respect to some specific
subject matter.

N.J. Pel Co.v. Communications Workers of America,

5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950); Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392,
82 P.2d 977 (1938).
A state legislature may also provide for the execution, through
administrative agencies, of its legislative policy, and may confer
upon such administrative officers certain powers and the duty of
determining the question of existence of certain facts upon which
the effect or execution of its legislative policy may be dependent.
Clayton v. Bennett, 5 U.2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956).
The Utah Air Conservation Act was enacted by the Utah Legislature in 1967. This act provided for,the creation in the State
Division of Health of the Utah Air Conservation Council, now known
as the Utah Air Conservation Committee for the State of Utah, and
empowered it to act in the control and prevention of air pollution.
In the eight years since its adoption, it has never been challenged
as unconstitutional until now.

In the instant case, the appellant

fails to carry a burden of proof which automatically attaches in
any case where a legislative act is involved.

A legislative enact-

ment is presumptively valid, and one who challenges it bears an
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extremely heavy burden to establish its unconstitutionality beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Stat.e, 179

Colo. 223, 499 P.2d 1176 (1972); Department of Health v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corporation, supra; State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing.
Company, supra.

To bear the extremely heavy burden of proving the

unconstitutionality of the statute, one would expect relevant
jurisdictional case law, or at the minimum, a citation or two from
the common law of other jurisdictions.

While all 50 states have

legislative enactments very similar to the Utah Air Conservation Act
and similar visible emission regulations, the appellant has failed '
to show where even one of these 50 acts and regulations has been
successfully challenged.
As an example of one of the enabling statutes in a sister state,
Respondent cites Section 5(b) of the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act.

It reads as follows:
"The Board (Pollution Control Board) shall determine, define, and implement the environmental control
standards applicable in the State of Illinois and may
adopt rules and regulations in accordance with Title
VII of this act."

This is a very broad jurisdictional statement for the board to act
in defining rules and regulations with regard to air pollution.
This act has been upheld, despite successive attacks to challenge
its constitutionality.
Furthermore, the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to
administrative agencies is normally sustained as valid, and the
standards which must accompany such a grant of legislative power
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Need not necessarily be set forth in expressed terms if they might
reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole. The
Court# in People v. Bevevino, 202 Misc. 723, 112 N.Y.S.2d 647, (1952),
which involved a prosecution for the violation of the regulation
limiting the density of smoke to be released into the atmosphere,
held that the delegation of the N e w York City Council to the Bureau
of Smoke Control of the power to adopt and amend rules and regulations relating to emission controls in open air of smoke and soot,
as well as fly ash products of combustion was not unconstitutional
and was a proper delegation of legislative authority.

Defendant

claimed that the very fact that it was the agency and not the city
council which created the offense under which he was prosecuted
indicated that the legislature had unlawfully delegated to the
agency the general power to determine what shall constitute an
cfffense or a violation of the law. Rejecting this contention, the
court pointed out that the legislature may delegate to an administrative agency the power to make reasonable rules and regulations with
the force and effect of law, and that in so doing, it is proper for
the legislature to declare the violation of these rules to be a
crime and provide the punishment for their violation.

In the case

of Bortz Coal Company v. Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa. Cmlth. 441,
279 A.2d 388 (1971), the court held that the enforcement of the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Air Pollution Commission did not
constitute a confiscation of property without due process. By merely
pointing out that
no
matter
how
seemingly
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vate ownership may be under our system of government, all property
must be held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regulation by the government to preserve the health, safety and morals
of the people.

In Houston Compressed Steel Corporation v. State,

456 S.W#2d 768 (Tex.Civ. App.1970), the Texas Clean Air Act was
attacked as an unlawful delegation to an administrative agency, in
that it gave such agency the power to adopt and regulate and control
the level of emissions of their contaminants into the air.

The court

took the position that the science of air pollution control is new
and inexact, and that such legislative standards are difficult to
devise, and that if such standards are to be effected, they must be
broad;

for if they are too precise, they will provide an easy es-

cape for those who wish to circumvent the law.

While thereby im-

pliedly admitting the broadness of the definition of air pollution
in the Texas law, the court was of the opinion that the definition
was clear and easily capable of understanding.

See also, State v.

Arizona Mine Supply Company, 107 Ariz. 199, 484 P.2d 619 (1971).
It has been alleged that the regulation is both vague and indefinite.

This contention was not persuasive in similar cases.

In

Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Pollution Control Board, supra, the
statute was found to be valid and did not constitute an unlawful
delegation of legislative power.

The petitioner, Fry, had alleged

an "abdication" of legislative responsibility.
found this to be unpersuasive.

The court, however,

The State of Utah contends that any

more specific guidelines than those already established, would inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fringe upon the flexibility
and
of the Utah Air Cnn-

servation Act.

in the case of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v.

State Department of Health, supra, at 1179, the court stated as
follows:
"The modern tendency is to permit liberal grants of
discretion to administrative agencies in order to facilitate the administration of laws dealing with involved
economic and governmental conditions. In other words,
the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems have lead to judicial
approval of broad standards for administrative action,
especially in regulatory enactments under the police
power.
The court also indicated that the 1969 law to which the Fry Company
advocated a return, as amended in 1970, was too precise —
tical, if not impossible to administer.11

"imprac-

.Id., at 1179.

The delegation of "quasi-legislative" powers to administrative
agencies, authorizing them to make rules and regulations, within
proper standards fixed by the legislature, are normally sustained
as valid, and barring a total abdication of their legislative powers,
there is no real constitutional prohibition against the delegation
of a large measure of authority to an administrative agency for the
administration of a statute enacted
power.

pursuant to a state's police

The standards which must accompany such grant of legisla-

tive power need not necessarily be set forth in expressed terms if
they might reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme as a
w

hole.

State v. Arizona Mine Supply Company, supra, at 625.

It

is clear that the Act is not vague and that the visible emissions
regulations accompanying the act are both definite and adequate,
and that the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to the Utah Air
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Conservation Committee is clearly constitutional.
We therefore urge that this court hold as did the High Court
of Colorado, that:
"The standards established in the Air Pollution
Control Act are not so broad as to result in an improper delegation of legislative authority, and the
Fry Roofing Company has failed to meet its burden of
overcoming the presumption of validity in this respect.'1 Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. State Department of Health, supra, at 1180.

POINT V
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION ACT IMPOSES CIVIL
SANCTIONS AND THE IMPOSITION OF SUCH PENALTIES BY THE COMMITTEE DID NOT DEPRIVE THE
LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The Federal Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial
in civil action in federal court, and nearly every state constitution contains a similar guarantee.
I, §10.

See Utah Constitution, Art.

They do not extend, but preserve the right of jury trial

as it existed in English history, either in 1791 when the Seventh
Amendment was adopted, Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296,
79 L.Ed. 603 (1943); Baltimore and C. Great Line v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654, 55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636 (1934), or, in the case of the
states at the date of the first state constitution.

People v. One,

1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951), in which
the court held as follows:
"The constitutional right to jury trial . . . is
the right as it existed at common law at the time the
state constitution was adopted . . . and what that
right is,
isby the
a Howard
purely
historical
question,
a fact which
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is to be ascertained like any other social, political

or legal fact . . . It is necessary, therefore, to
ascertain what was the rule of the English common
law upon this subject in 1850."
The foregoing quotation emphasizes the point that the right to a
jury trial as preserved by the federal and state constitutions has
substantially the same meaning, extent, and application as it had
at common law, and the provisions related to this right are to be
interpreted and construed in the light of the common law, at the
time of their adoption.
In all other cases, the legislature may provide for a hearing
or trial without a jury, as they have done in hearings before administrative agencies.

An early statute setting up a special tribunal

to hear claims against a municipal corporation was held constitutionally valid under the Seventh Amendment, as a proceeding "not in the
nature of a suit at common law.1'

Guthrie National Bank v. City of

Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 19 S.Ct. 513, 43 L.Ed. 796 (1898).

Under

constitutional provisions, the right of trial by jury is preserved
inviolate only as the classes of cases in which that right was enjoyed before the adoption of the constitution.

In all other cases,

the legislature may provide for a hearing or a trial without a jury.
The 7th Amend, didn't create a right to a jury trial but merely preserved rights then existing at common law.

General Tire and Rubber

Company v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 191 (4th Circuit), cert. den. 377 U.S.
952.

The purpose and effect of Article III, Section 2 of the United

States Constitution, providing that at the trial of all crimes excepting cases of impeachment shall be by jury, is not to enlarge
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trial by jury in all cases in which it had been recognized by the
common law and in all cases of like nature.

Ex parte Querin, 317

U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942).
Every state legislature has passes some form of clean air provisions, and created an administrative agency to promulgate rules
and enforce its sanctions.

Violators are always allowed a form of

judicial review which begins with a hearing before the agency and
concludes with an appeal to the state or United States Supreme Court.
The Illinois Environmental Protection Act is quite similar to that
of Utah in this respect.

The clean air provisions, as far as

judicial review, in the State of Illinois, are:
Any party to a board hearing, any person who filed
a complaint on which a hearing was denied, any person
who has been denied a variance or permit under this act,
and any party adversely affected by a final order or
determination of the board may obtain judicial review,
by filing a petition for a veview within 35 days after
the entry of the order or other final action complained
of, pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative
Review Act, approved May 8, 1945, as amended, and the
rules adopted pursuant thereto, except that review shall
be afforded directly in the appellate court for the district in which the cause of action arose and not in the
circuit court. Review of any rule or regulation promulgated by the board shall not be limited by this
section but may also be had as provided in Section 29
of this act.
The Utah Code is similar in its provisions to those of the Illinois
Code.

It is clear that administrative hearings before qualified

members of the agency are an adequate safeguard for the prote tion
of civil rights.

Section 26-24-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as

amended) allows for a review of any final order of the committee
in the Utah State Supreme Court.

The appropriate sections of the
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code are Section 26-24-11(31 fW . w"hir-"h c^fnc.

Hearings may be held before the committee or any
hearing examiner of the committee or any committee member as hearing examiner when this member has been especially appointed by the committee to hold such hearing.
The committee may appoint one or more hearing examiners,
and the committee or any hearing examiner shall have
power and authority to call, preside and conduct hearings, including the power to issue subpoenaes to compel
witnesses and the production of pertinent, relevent
evidence on behalf of all parties. A full and complete
record will be kept of all proceedings before the committee or hearing examiner, and all testimony shall be
taken down by a reporter employed by the committee.
Upon the conclusion of a hearing, a hearing examiner
or committee, as the case may be, shall make findings
of fact which shall include all evidential or ultimate
facts necessary to support this order. Findings of fact
and orders of copies of all of them shall be furnished
to each of the parties in interest, the original of which
shall be part of the records of the case. The order of
the hearing examiner or committee shall be the final order
of the committee unless a petition for a review is filed
as provided in subsection 3(c) of this section.
Subsection 3(c) of this section states:
Any person or persons aggrieved by an order entered
by a hearing examiner or by the committee may file a
motion for a review of the order. Upon the filing of
s- such motion to review his order, the hearing examiner
may:
(i) Reopen the case and enter a suppplemental
order after holding such further hearing and receiving
such further evidence as he may deem necessary; or
(ii) Amend or modify his prior order by supplemental order; or
(iii) Refer the entire case to the committee.
The hearing examiner makes the supplemental order, it shall
be final, unless a motion to review the same shall be filed
with the committee.
Section 26-24-12 states:
Except as specifically provided in this section
and in Section* 26-24-11(5)(e), all final orders or
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determinations of the committee or the executive
secretary are subject to judicial review in the
Supreme Court of Utah. Such a review may be secured by any person adversely affected by the such
person filing a petition in the Supreme Court at
any time after this final order or determination
but not later than 30 days after the date of any
final enforcement order or determination which
specifically requires affirmative action on the
part of such person if this person made an appearance at the hearing held before the committee as
to which the final order or determination was made
or is not served with notice of such hearing, if
notice was required by provisions of this act.
The petition shall be served upon the executive
secretary and shall state grounds upon which review is sought. As to matters directly appealable to the Supreme Court, upon review, the
court may affirm, modify or set aside the final
order, but only upon the following grounds:
(a) that the committee or the executive
secretary acted without or in excess of its powers.
(b) that the findings of fact and conclusions
of the committee are not supported by substantial
evidence.

**

The committee and every party to the action or proceeding
before the committee shall have the right to appear in the
review proceeding.
The Utah Code provisions have allowed for adequate due process

of law.

Persons adversely affected are allowed a hearing, the right

to a rehearing, and a final review of the order in the Utah Supreme
Court.

Due process of law does not requre a jury trial.

As mentioned

earlier, the right to a jury trial shall remain inviolate, but only
in cases where it was maintained at common law.

The Illinois Con-

stitution is similar to the Utah State Constitution with regard to
the right of trial by jury, as well.

Article I, Section 13, of the

Illinois State Constitution states:

"The right of trial by jury

rNv^f^frtvo

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on-irtvo^ eVial 1 r e m a i n
i rnn* n l a f p
"

Article I# Section 10# of the Utah State Constitution states, in
part as follows:
M

In capital cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate . . . "
Where there is a determination of facts by experts in an administrative hearing, with the right of appellate review of the decision,
the right to a trial by jury has not been abridged.

At common law,

no administrative hearing procedures were known, and the state and
federal constitutions merely preserved the right to jury trial.
They did not enlarge them.

When a determination of facts is made

by a panel of experts, more able to sift through the complex scientific and technical evidence, there is a lessening of the probability
of error.
A challenge to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act was
made in the case of Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 111.
App. 3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973).
instant case, were involved.

Several issues, basic to the

Called upon to determine whether the

Act provided for criminal or civil sanctions, the court concluded:
" . • • It is to be construed as evidencing that
a civil sanction was intended. No mention of crime or
criminal prosecution is made in the Act . . . Id.
at 542.
The Utah statutes evidence as well a civil sanction rather than a
criminal sanction or prosecution in the Utah Air Conservation Act.
The petitioner, in Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra,
claimed that his constitutional right to a jury trial was bethe Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
ing deprived. Digitized
Theby court,
ruling
contention
to be meritless,
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explained:
Section 13 of Article I of the Constitution of
1970 provides: 'The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.1 . . . /E/xcept
for changes in punctuation /it/ is identical with the
. . . 1870 Constitution of Illinois. No change in
construction was, therefore, intended. It has been consistently held that such constitutional language was
designed simply to secure thr right of trial by jury
in all tribunals, as it had heretofore been enjoyed;
but it was not intended to confer the right in any
class of cases where it had not previously existed;
and that it was not intended to guarantee trial by
jury in special statutory proceedings unknown at
/
common law. Ford v. E.P.A., supra, at 545.
The same conclusion was reached in Cobin v. Pollution Control
Board, 16 111. App.3d 958, 307 N.E.2d 191 (1974).

In Lloyd A. Fry

Roofing Company v. Pollution Control Board, supra, the court stated:

^

Petitioner's contention that the act deprives it'
of its constitutional right to a trial by jury is also
without merit. . . . /t/he Act provides for the creation of an administrative agency to enforce the Act.
The constitutional guarantee of right to trial by jury
was never intended to apply to administrative proceedings
which were unknown at common law, and therefore, petitioner cannot argue that his right has been abridged.
Id., at 35 7-358.

In the case of Lloyd a Fry Roofing Company v. State of Texas,
516 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), the state brought an action
for injunctive relief and statutory penalties for alleged violations
of the Clean Air Air by the manufacturing of asphalt roofing shingles.

In this case the court held that the primary jurisdiction

must first be exercised by an administrative body before a court
can obtain jurisidiction.

This supports the position that the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction is before an administrative agency
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cedural safeguards exist to protect basic rights.

The Utah Code

provisions have allowed for adequate due process of law and do not
require a right to jury trial.

Persons adversely affected are

allowed notice, a hearing, the right to a rehearing and final review by the Utah Supreme Court.

Respondent contends that the penal-

ties provided in the Utah Air Conservation Act provide for civil
penalties.

A hearing is provided before an administrative agency,

and no actual adjudication in a court of law occurs.

Primary

jurisdiction is conducted by the administrative agency, and enforcement lies with the determination of such administrative agency.

No

criminal sanctions are imposed by a court of law in accordance with
the penalty provisions of the Utah Air Conservation Act.

No penal-

ties are listed in the penal code, and the procedures described are
clearly administrative in nature.

This is an administrative hearing

and due process protections under the state and federal constitutions
do not require that the government's case for civil penalty be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.

State and federal court rulings hold that

a proceeding, such as the one at bar, is civil in nature, even though
the effect is to punish an offense.
in this type

The courts have concluded that

of proceeding the correct standard of proof is a pre-

ponderance of the evidence and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
As already shown, there is judicial agreement that the defendant in
such a proceeding does not have a right to a jury trial, is not entitled to the presumption of innocence, and that the action is conducted according to the rules of civil procedure.
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In a leading case, the United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37,
34 S.Ct. 213, 58 L.Ed. 494 (1914), the Supreme Court reviewed a
long line of federal cases dealing with the issue of whether an
action to collect a penalty was civil or criminal in nature and
then stated:
It is a necessary conclusion from these
cases (1) That as respects a pecuniary penalty
for the commission of a public offense, Congress competently may authorize . . . enforcement of such penalty by either a criminal
prosecution or a civil action; . . . and (3)
That, if not directed otherwise, such an
action is to be conducted and determined
according to the same rules and with the same
incidents as are other civil actions.
As to the quantum of evidence required to recover the penalty, the
court decided:
. . . while in a strictly criminal prosecution
the jury may not return a verdict against the
defendant unless the evidence establishes his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in a civil
action, it is the duty of the jury to resolve
the issues of fact according to a reasonable
preponderance of the evidence, and this although they may involve a penalized or criminal
act. icL, at 49.
A major theory in the cases with regard to jury trial are that
since there were no administrative hearing procedures known at common law, the state and federal constitutions merely preserve the
rights that existed at their adoption, but do not enlarge upon them.
A second significant theory is that when a determination of facts is
made by a panel of experts, more able to sift through the complex
scientific and technical evidence of air pollution cases, there is
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU.
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of Library,
error.
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administrative
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agencies do not impose criminal penalties.

Helvering v. Mitchell,

303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1937), wherein the court
stated as follows:
Civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted
rules and constitutional guarantees governing the trial
of criminal prosecution. Ij3., at 402.
In Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 68 S.Ct. 115, 92 L.Ed. 59
(1947), the court held as follows:
The concept of a jury passing independently on
an issue previously determined by an administrative
body or reviewing the action of an administrative
body is contrary to settled federal administrative
practice; the constitutional right to a jury trial
does not include the right to have a jury pass on
the validity of an administrative order . . . When
the judge determines that there was a basis in fact
to support classification, the issue need not and
should not be submitted to the jury. IcL , at 444.
Committing the

factfinding function to an administrative agency

does not, in itself, constitute a denial of due process of law.
There is substantial authority that a requirement of due process in
a constitutional provision does not require a trial by jury.

Hawkins

v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678 (1916); and that
such a due process clause does not imply that all trials in state
courts affecting personal or property rights must be by a jury trial.
Hardware Dealers Manufacturing v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 52 S.Ct.
69, 76 L.Ed. 214 (19

) ; Wagner Electric Manufacturing Company v.

Linden, 26? U.S. 226, 43 S.Ct. 589, 67 L.Ed 961 (1922).

In investi-

gating adjudicatory functions in an administrative agency, the constitutional right to a jury trial may not be violated.

Lipke v.

..Ct. 549, 66 L.Ed. 1061 (1921);
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Joint

Anti-Fascist Refugee Community v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624,
95 L.Ed. 817 (1950). Neither the state nor the constitution guarantee or preserve the right of trial by jury, except in those cases
where it existed when the constitution was adopted.

Constitutional

guarantees do not apply to a statutory proceeding nor in the nature
of a suit at common law.

The constitutional guarantee does not

apply to special and summary proceedings created by statute subsequent to the adoption of the constitution, where they are not in
the nature of suits at common law and are dissimilar to such suits.
Determination effects in such proceedings may be left to administrative agencies. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation,
301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1936); Crowell v. Benson,
?85 U.S. 22, 5 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 595 (1931).

POINT VI
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY THE
CERTIFIED SMOKE READERS TO TAKE THEIR VISIBLE
EMISSIONS READINGS WERE REASONABLE AND WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THE "OPEN FIELDS" DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
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seizures marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values
of the constitution.

Whether a particular "search11 or "seizure"

is unreasonable depends upon two traditional factors.

First, does

the person exhibit an "actual expectation of privacy?"

Second,

is that exhibited expectation "one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable."

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

The facts of the instant

case unequivocably demonstrate that the appellant exhibited no
expectation of privacy, and that even if appellant did exhibit
such an expectation, it would not be one that society would deem
reasonable.
First, the emissions from Fry's two stacks were clearly visible to persons in the area (Tr., Vol.1, p.252).

Second, when the

Division of Health and County inspectors visited the plant vicinity
to make the readings, they notified the Fry company prior to the
making of their readings and were never asked to leave the premises.
There is no indication that the appellant maintained an objection to
periodic inspections, and, in fact, assisted with a demonstration on
September 5, 1973.

Finally, the evidence shows that the smoke readers

made the Fry company aware of their readings and even showed them
the results of those readings after their readings had been taken.
The smoke readers made their readings either off the plant premises
or on the plant premises, generally open to the public.

The con-

siderations of visibility, public access, and no showing of intrusion
all demonstrate that the appellant neither exhibited nor had any
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actual expectation of privacy and was not entitled to any protections
of the Fourth Amendment.

See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87

S.Ct. 1738, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1966).

Moreover, the courts support

the proposition that even if Fry Company could show that it had a
subjective expectation of privacy, it would not have been one that
society would deem reasonable.
Even if the smoke reader's observations of the highly visible
emissions can be termed a search, in that the observers occasionally stood on company land, it was not unreasonable, since such
action clearly falls within the "open fields" exception to the
Fourth Amendment.

In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct.

445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1923), where the defendant's own illegal actions
of concealing moonshine whiskey were observed by revenue agents
concealed on his land, the court held that the "special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their "persons,
houses, papers and effects" is not extended to the open fields.
Supra, at 59.

See also United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637, at

640 (9th Cir. 1970).
In the most recent decision concerning this aspect of the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States held the "open
fields" exception applicable to administrative inspections with
regard to air pollution.

In Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western

Alfalfa Corporation, 416 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 1966, 40 L.Ed.2d 607
(1974), an inspector of the Colorado Health Department conducted
visible emissions
readings of smoke emitted from respondent's stacks,
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without first obtaining a warrant or the owner's consent.

After a

hearing by the Variance Board and a review by the district court,
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that pollution tests of this
nature violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches.

The Supreme Court of Colorado denied certiorari,

but it was granted by the United States Supreme Court.

In reversing

the Colorado decision, the United States Supreme Court held unanimously that (1) the inspector's observation from company-owned land
did not constitute an unreasonable search, since he had not entered
the plant or offices, but merely cited plumes of smoke, visible to
anyone who was near the plant; there had been no showing that the
public was excluded from the property, and (2) the inspector's
action in conducting visual smoke opacity readings, whether he
operated on or outside the premises, was within the "open fields"
exception of the Fourth Amendment.
In summary, it is clear that the instant case falls within
the bounds of Western Alfalfa, and that the administrative searches
conducted by the state and county-employed inspectors were reasonable
and within the scope of the "open fields" doctrine.

The accurate

smoke readings were done according to the rules and regulations
within the exception•

No expectation of privacy on the defendant's

land was intended, and the readings were taken where the public was
allowed to frequent.

The nature of the violations are clearly in

violation of public health laws and surely outweigh the allegation
of a right of privacy.
right.

The Fourth Amendment does not grant an absolute
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by appellant.

Notice was received by Fry Company officials both

before the readings were taken and by notice of violation mailed
subsequently, reporting violations.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Air Conservation Committee clearly met its burden of
establishing that the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company violated Section
3.2 of the Visible Emissions Regulations.

The findings, conclu-

sions and decision of the committee are based on substantial and
factual evidence as indicated in the transcript of the hearing.

The

Utah Air Conservation Act has provided clear and reasonable legislative guidelines to the Utah Air Conservation Committee to carry
out its administrative functions within the protections of the due
process of law;

The Utah State Implementation Plan for Air Quality

clearly sets forth the emission limitations which were approved by
the Environmental Protection Agency to insure that federal ambient
air standards could be attained in accordance with the Clean Air Act
of 1970 and its accompanying amendments.

The state submits that the

Utah Air Conservation Act imposes sanctions in. accordance with administrative determinations and that the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company
was not denied any constitutional right to a jury trial.

The com-

mittee further alleges that the administrative searches conducted
by smoke readers were objective in nature and conducted by properly
trained and certified smoke readers to make visible emissions readings
which were reasonable and within the scope of the "open fields"
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doctrine.
The Utah Air Conservation Committee requests that this court
should affirm the order of Dr. Grant S. Winn, decision and orders
entered by the Utah Air Conservation Committee and memorandum
decision of the Third Judicial District Court.

Respondent sub-

mits that this Court must sustain the findings and conclusions of
the Utah Air Conservation Committee upon the basis that substantial
and factual evidence was presented at the hearing, showing that the
committee and executive secretary acted within the powers granted
to them by the legislature.

Substantial evidence was presented to

support the findings and decisions.
Respectfully submitted,
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